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Abstract
Natural languages generally use such patterns as ‘A is B’ or ‘A and B are the same’ to mean an identity relation.
However, it remains unclear what the cognitive mechanism actually is in using these identity statements. In
this study, I embed the identity statements in attitude reports and investigate possible and impossible readings
for such attitude reports as ‘John thinks A is B’, ‘John thinks A and B are the same’, etc. Intriguingly, the study
reveals that felicitous ‘de dicto’ identity reports have no corresponding ‘de re’ reports. To account for this
effect, I propose that the identity relation between A and B as encoded in natural languages means the
contextually salient properties coerced from the expression A hold in a certain world (e.g., in the belief worlds
of an attitude holder) for the individual named B and vice versa. The current analysis also suggests that natural
language users can have access to some expressions in two different ways simultaneously: both as descriptions
to describe certain objects and as variable names to refer to certain objects.
This working paper is available in University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics: http://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/
vol22/iss1/34
Motivating a Symmetric Copula ‘Be’ in Attitude Reports
Linmin Zhang∗
1 Introduction
The identity relation in natural languages has traditionally been considered as a primitive and formally
represented simply with the symbol ‘=’. For example, Frege 1892, the pioneering work on the mean-
ing difference between ‘A = A’ and ‘A = B’, represents the meaning of natural language identity state-
ments, such as A is B, A is the same as B or A and B coincide, simply as [A = B] and investigates the
semantic ontology of the two things involved in the identity relation (here A and B), leaving the mean-
ing of the symbol ‘=’ unscrutinized. In various recent accounts of internal or external readings of same
(e.g., Heim 1985, Solomon 2009, Hardt and Mikkelsen 2015), it also seems sufficient to formalize,
e.g., [[John and Mary read the same book]], as [the book that John read = the book that Mary read]
(see Heim 1985 and Solomon 2009), with little or no discussion on the exact meaning of ‘=’ used in
such a formalization.
In this paper, based on empirical evidence from attitude reports, I argue against the view that the
identity relation as encoded in natural languages is a primitive. Here is the reasoning in a nutshell: I
start with a brief introduction to the de re/de dicto distinction and present the relatively uncontroversial
assumption that felicitous de re attitude reports are derived from felicitous de dicto reports through
the substitution of co-referring names of a res. Based on this, I provide new empirical data in this
paper, showing that when a de dicto report expresses an identity relation between two res, no de
re report can be derived via the substitution of co-referring names of a certain res. The failure of
deriving a de re report from a de dicto identity report suggests that the expressions of res names in a
de dicto identity report contribute not only extensionally, i.e., as res names, but also intensionally.
Thus I propose that in natural languages, the identity relation between two res is essentially a mutual
predication between them, as informally described in (1):
(1) Main claim on the semantics of the identity relation expressed in natural languages:
[[A is B]] is a mutual predication: the contextually relevant property coerced from the
expression B holds for the res referred to with the expession A, and the contextually relevant
property coerced from the expression A holds for the res referred to with the expression B.
The argumentation and analysis presented in this paper focus on the uses of English copula be
and such identity statements of the pattern A is B. Section 2 and Section 3 present backgrounds of
the current study: Section 2 introduces the de re/de dicto distinction; Section 3 presents Percus and
Sharvit 2014’s analysis on the asymmetric use of English copula be in atttitude reports. Section 4
presents empirical data motivating the current study: I show that different from a de dicto predication
report X thinks A is B, which contains an asymmetric be, a de dicto identity report X thinks A is
B contains a symmetric use of be and has no corresponding de re report. Based on this empirical
contrast, in Section 5, I propose that the symmetric use of be can be analyzed as a mutual (or double)
use of asymmetric be, and on the base of this proposal, I account for the data presented in Section 4
and explain why de dicto identity reports cannot give rise to felicitous de re reports through the
substitution of co-referring names. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss two consequences: Section 6
shows that with regard to the phenomena discussed in this paper, imagination reporting predicates
such as dream actually behave similarly to the canonical belief reporting predicate think (cf. Percus
and Sauerland 2003, Sudo 2014), and argues that, at least with regard to the phenomena under
discussion, a separate treatment for imagination reports (e.g., Ninan 2008, 2012) seems unnecessary
(see also Yanovich 2011); Section 7 shows how the current analysis converges with Fine 2007 and
sheds light on Frege’s puzzle on identity statements. Section 8 concludes the paper and suggests
avenues for further research.
∗Many thanks to Chris Barker and Orin Percus for suggestions and discussions. I also thank Maria Aloni,
Lucas Champollion, Liina Pylkkänen, Anna Szabolcsi and the reviewers and audience of PLC 39 for comments.
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2 Background I: The De re/De dicto Distinction
In this section, I first use examples to illustrate the intuitive difference between a de dicto report and
a de re report; then I introduce the basic assumption in studying de re reports; finally, following the
strategy of Sudo (2014), I show a compositional derivation of the truth condition of a de re report.
To begin with, (2–4) show three slightly different contexts, and the attitude reports (2a–4a) and
(2b–4b) are all felicitous in these contexts, i.e., each of these utterances of Sam has at least one natural
and true reading in its context.
(2) IGNORANCE CONTEXT: Bill meets an unfamiliar beautiful girl with red hair in a party and
gets attracted to her without even knowing her name. Sam and Jennifer know the girl very
well: She is Victoria. Seeing that Bill is obsessed with the girl, Sam says to Jennifer:
a. ‘Bill surely thinks that the girl with red hair is attractive.’ de dicto: X
b. ‘Bill surely thinks that Victoria is attractive.’ de dicto: 7; de re: X
(3) MISAPPREHENSION CONTEXT: Bill meets an unfamiliar beautiful girl with red hair in a
party and gets attracted to her, thinking that she must be Lola, a supermodel he has only heard
about. Sam and Jennifer know the girl very well: Her name is actually Victoria. Seeing that
Bill is obsessed with the girl, Sam says to Jennifer:
a. ‘Bill surely thinks that the girl with red hair is attractive.’ de dicto: X
b. ‘Bill surely thinks that Victoria is attractive.’ de dicto: 7; de re: X
(4) CORRECT KNOWLEDGE CONTEXT: Bill meets an unfamiliar beautiful girl with red hair in
a party and gets attracted to her; soon he correctly learns her real name: Victoria. Sam and
Jennifer also know the girl. Seeing that Bill is obsessed with the girl, Sam says to Jennifer:
a. ‘Bill surely thinks that the girl with red hair is attractive.’ de dicto: X
b. ‘Bill surely thinks that Victoria is attractive.’ de dicto: X; de re: X
Evidently, in all these three scenarios (2–4), if Bill, the attitude holder here, hears somebody say ‘the
girl with red hair is attractive’, he will naturally agree with the claim himself. Thus, these attitude
reports (2a–4a) are felicitous in the de dicto sense.
In contrast, only in the correct knowledge context (4), but not in the ignorance context (2) or
the misapprehension context (3), will Bill agree with the claim that ‘Victoria is attractive’ if he
hears somebody say so, because in context (2) or context (3), Bill is unable to recognize that the name
Victoria refers to the red-haired girl. Nevertheless, even under these two contexts, Sam’s utterances
(2b–3b) are still intuitively true, indicating that substituting the expression the girl with red hair in
the de dicto reports (2a–3a) with Victoria does not affect the truth value. Thus, attitude reports with a
substitution of expressions salva veritate, such as (2b–3b), are felicitous in the de re sense.1,2
De re attitude reports have been much studied in philosophy of language. According to neo-
Russellianism, which represents a pretty standard view on this, the fact that de re reports (2b–3b)
are true in the ignorance context (2) or the misapprehension context (3) can be traced back to the
fact that the expression Victoria in these de re reports and the expression the girl with red hair in the
corresponding de dicto reports (2a–3a) play the same role: They are both extensional expressions
and share the same reference.3 In other words, differing from what Frege might claim, in these
attitude reports, although syntactically, the girl with red hair and Victoria are in the scope of an
1These examples also show that such an attitude report as Bill surely thinks that Victoria is attractive is
unambiguously a de re report only in an ignorance or misapprehension context; In a correct knowledge context,
such an attitude report is ambiguous between a felicitous de dicto reading and a felicitous de re reading. In other
words, empirically, the de re/de dicto distinction only shows up in an ignorance or misapprehension context.
2In these contexts, Sam is the narrator who produces the attitude reports. Anna Szabolcsi (p.c.) points out
that de re readings are only possible when (i) there is a narrator and (ii) the narrator (here Sam) is involved in
the situation. Thus, in this paper, when analyzing attitude reports, the free variable w0 that I use to refer to the
reference/actual world should actually be considered as a world in the set of the narrator’s belief worlds.
3See McKay and Nelson 2014 for a detailed review on the neo-Russellian view on attitude reports.
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attitude reporting predicate (here think), these expressions are semantically extensional: They denote
an extensional reference, i.e., a res of type e, not an intensional concept of type 〈se〉 that varies with
possible worlds (or attitude holders). Based on this reasoning, neo-Russellianism assumes (5):
(5) Basic assumption on the reducibility of de re reports:
For any felicitous de re report p, there is a felicitous de dicto report p′ such that the de re
report p is derived from the de dicto report p′ via a substitution of co-referring res names.
Thus, a felicitous de re report is necessarily reducible to a de dicto report.
Notice that assumption (5) says that each de re report is necessarily derived from a de dicto report, but
it does not say that for any de dicto report, there is necessarily a corresponding de re report derived
from it. Indeed, certain de dicto reports don’t even contain a res and thus it is impossible that any
de re report be derived from such de dicto reports. For example, suppose that Ralph has the general
opinion that the longest linguistics paper has more than 100 pages, with no particular long paper in
his mind, and suppose that the paper Ortcutt has just finished is in fact the longest linguistics paper:
In this context, the attitude report Ralph thinks that the paper Ortcutt has just finished has more than
100 pages is intuitively false, because the de dicto report Ralph thinks that the longest linguistics
paper has more than 100 pages is about no particular individual paper that Ralph is acquainted with
(i.e., no res) and thus no substitution of co-referring res names can happen.
Under the neo-Russellian assumption, much work has been done on the definition of an appropri-
ate res. In this paper, I mainly follow Kaplan 1969 and Lewis 1979 and assume that an appropriate
res for an attitude holder needs to stand in an acquaintance relation with the attitude holder so that
the res becomes a character in the inner story of the attitude holder.
Here I need to emphasize that a res is a character in the inner story of an attitude holder, and
there is not necessarily a one-to-one relation between a res and a real character in the actual world.4
This means that (i) the same real character in the actual world can be two different characters in the
inner story of an attitude holder (imagine that some people fail to recognize that Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde are the same actual person), and (ii) it is also possible that different real characters in the actual
world become one single res in the inner story of an attitude holder (imagine that a few Hogwarts staff
members mistakenly take the Weasley twins George and Fred as the same person). Thus, we need to
bear in mind that a res is different from a real character in the actual world; nevertheless, a res is an
objective extensional being of type e, potentially accessible to more than one attitude holders and not
necessarily private to a single attitude holder; otherwise, if res were necessarily private, interlocutors
would not be able to refer to and discuss the same thing, and the communication would be impossible.
Based on this informal analysis of res and de re reports, I show a compositional derivation of the
truth condition of a de re report in (6). (6) follows the strategy of Sudo 2014: First, the truth condition
of a de dicto report is compositionally derived; then, based on the truth condition of a de dicto report
and a co-reference relation between res names, the truth condition of a de re report can be derived.
(6) Deriving the truth condition of a de re report:
a. Lexical items:5
[[Bill]]e
def
= Bill; [[Victoria]]e
def
= Victoria; [[think]]w def= λ p〈st〉.λxe.∀w′ ∈ Doxw(x)[p(w′)]
[[the]]〈et,e〉
def
= λP〈et〉.ιx[P(x)] (i.e., the contextually unique P)
[[girl with red hair]]〈s,et〉
def
= λws.λxe.[red-haired-girl(w)(x)]
[[is attractive]]〈s,et〉
def
= λws.λxe.[attractive(w)(x)]
b. Step 1: Deriving the truth condition of a de dicto report
[[the girl with red hair is attractive]]〈st〉
= λw.[[[the]][[[girl with red hair]](w)]][[[is attractive]](w)]
4I often use the expression the actual world as a convenient way to say the possible world serving as the
reference. Thus, the actual world does not mean the physically realistic world where we live, and famous
fictional characters, e.g. Harry Potter, can be legitimate real characters in certain actual (i.e., reference) worlds.
5The meaning of copula be will be discussed in later sections; here I follow the analysis of Keshet 2010: a
predicate of type 〈s,et〉 first takes a (free or bound) world variable before combining with [[the]]; evidently, in the
case of de dicto readings, this world variable is bound, while in the case of de re readings, it is free.
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= λw.[the contextually unique red-haired-girl in w is attractive in w]
[[Bill thinks that the girl with red hair is attractive]]w0de dicto
= ∀w′ ∈ Doxw0(Bill)[the contextually unique red-haired-girl in w′ is attractive in w′]
i.e., every world w′ in the set of Bill’s belief worlds is such that the contextually unique
red-haired girl in w′ is attractive in w′.
c. Step 2: Substituting co-referring res names
[[Bill thinks that Victoria is attractive]]w0de re = ∀w
′ ∈ Doxw0(Bill)[V is attractive in w′]
The truth condition of this de re report is such that (i) the de dicto report
[[Bill thinks that the girl with red hair is attractive]]w0de dicto is true and (ii) the extensional
expressions [[the girl with red hair]]w
′∈Doxw0 (Bill) and [[Victoria]] co-refer.
3 Background II: Percus and Sharvit’s (2014) Analysis of Asymmetric Be
My analysis of identity statements and symmetric be will be based on Percus and Sharvit 2014’s
analysis of asymmetric be in attitude reports. Percus and Sharvit 2014 aims to account for the de re
report (7a) uttered under the mistaken identity context (7) (see also Cumming 2008 for a discussion
on such contexts). In this context, Becky is Dan has an asymmetric meaning: the de re report Kevin
thinks that Becky is Dan can be felicitously followed by but he doesn’t think that Dan is Becky. Based
on this empirical evidence, Percus and Sharvit 2014 claims that in natural languages, [[A is B]] and
[[B is A]] do not always have the same meaning, which motivates the existence of asymmetric be.
(7) MISTAKEN IDENTITY CONTEXT: Peter is throwing a party in honor of his cousin Dan who
has just been awarded his PhD. All the guests know that, but they don’t all know Dan (and
some of them, like Kevin, don’t even know the new PhD’s name). When Becky arrives,
Kevin, who is already completely toasted, walks up to her with a big smile. ‘You must be
proud to be a doctor now,’ he says, ‘is your wife coming too?’ Seeing this, Jim says to Peter:
a. ‘Kevin thinks that Becky is Dan, (but he doesn’t think that Dan is Becky).’ de re: X
The original analysis of asymmetric be proposed in Percus and Sharvit 2014 is shown in (8): (8a)
shows that asymmetric be relates an individual concept of type 〈se〉 (here k) and an individual of type
e (here x), and means the relation ‘=’ between the individual concept and the individual; (8b) shows
that when asymmetric be is apparently used to relate two expressions of individual names (e.g., in the
case of Becky is Dan), there is a contextually salient type shifter f , which takes one individual as its
argument and returns an individual concept (here f (y)), and asymmetric be further relates f (y) and x.
(8) Percus and Sharvit 2014’s analysis of asymmetric be:
a. [[beasymmetric]]w〈se,et〉
def
= λk〈se〉.λxe.x = k(w)
b. [[beasymmetric]]w〈e,et〉
def
= λye.λxe.x = [ f〈e,se〉(y)](w)
Percus and Sharvit 2014 doesn’t give a definition for the symbol ‘=’ used in (8). Notice that the
symbol ‘=’ is traditionally polysemic: ‘x = y’ expresses a value equality between two variable names,
while ‘x = 3’ expresses a predication relation between a variable name and a value. Evidently, all
the equality or equivalence relations are necessarily symmetric, and therefore, in Percus and Sharvit
2014’s analysis, ‘=’ has to mean a predication, which is asymmetric.
Thus, I rewrite Percus and Sharvit 2014’s analysis in (9): (9a) shows that asymmetric be relates
a property of type 〈s,et〉 and an individual of type e, and the property holds for the individual in a
relevant world; (9b) shows that when asymmetric be apparently relates two expressions of individual
names, one of the expressions (here y) is coerced into and interpreted as some contextually salient
property in a world (represented as P(w,y) here), and asymmetric be further relates P(w,y) and x.6
6In contrast to Percus and Sharvit 2014, I choose not use a type shifter of type 〈e,〈s,et〉〉 to turn an individual
name into a property, because the exact meaning of P(world, name expression) reflects what property an attitude
holder associates with a certain expression in a context and involves a complex cognitive process for the attitude
holder in perceiving the name. Thus, the relation between a name expression (e.g., y) and the property coerced
from it (e.g., P(w,y)) is probably beyond the compositional semantics, and I do not study this issue now.
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(9) The analysis of asymmetric be (my revised version):
a. [[beasymmetric]]w〈〈s,et〉,et〉
def
= λP〈s,et〉.λxe.P(w)(x)
b. [[beasymmetric]]w〈e,et〉
def
= λye.λxe.P(w,y)(w)(x) P(w,y) is of type 〈s,et〉.
Based on the semantics of asymmetric be in (9), (10) accounts for the asymmetry shown in (7a):
(10) a. [[Kevin thinks that Becky is Dan]]w0de re = ∀w
′ ∈ Doxw0(Kevin)[P(w′,Dan)(w′)(Becky)]
i.e., every world w′ in the set of Kevin’s belief worlds is such that the contextually relevant
properties of being Dan (here being a new PhD) holds for the res named Becky in w′.
Given the context (7), an appropriate de re reading is available.
b. [[Kevin thinks that Dan is Becky]]w0de re = ∀w
′ ∈ Doxw0(Kevin)[P(w′,Becky)(w′)(Dan)]
i.e., every world w′ in the set of Kevin’s belief worlds is such that the contextually relevant
properties of being Becky holds for the res named Dan in w′. Given the context (7), no
appropriate de re reading is available.
4 New Data: A De Dicto Identity Report Has no Corresponding De Re Report
In this section, I present new empirical data, showing that (i) de dicto identity reports motivate the
existence of a symmetric be, and (ii) moreover, different from de dicto reports with an asymmetric
be, felicitous de dicto reports with a symmetric be (i.e., felicitous de dicto identity reports) cannot
give rise to corresponding felicitous de re reports through the substitution of co-referring res names.
The anonymous reviewing context (11) provides the common background information for (12)
and (13); (12) and (13) show two different sub-contexts as well as the felicity judgment of some de
dicto and de re attitude reports under these two sub-contexts.
(11) ANONYMOUS REVIEWING CONTEXT: After submitting a paper to a journal, John gets an
anonymous review for his paper. The review is actually written by Mary, but of course, John
doesn’t know this. Mike is an editor of the journal and he knows that Mary is the reviewer.
(12) SUB-CONTEXT A – PREDICATION CONTEXT: Afterwards, when John meets Mike, he tells
Mike that he finds the review is very old-fashioned and shows a certain empathy for baldness,
and John says: ‘I think the author of the review should be a bald man in his 90s.’ Mike
discloses nothing to John, but later he tells the whole story to another person, Tim:
de dicto report corresponding de re report
a. ‘John thinks that the reviewer is
a bald man in his 90s.’
X a′. ‘John thinks that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.’
X
b. ‘John thinks that a bald man in
his 90s is the reviewer.’
7 b′. ‘John thinks that a bald man in
his 90s is Mary.’
7
c. ‘John thinks that the reviewer
and a 90-year old bald man are
the same person.’
7 c′. ‘John thinks that Mary and a 90-
year old bald man are the same
person.’
7
(13) SUB-CONTEXT B – IDENTITY CONTEXT: Afterwards, John and Mike go to a party. There
John sees a bald man in his 90s talking about John’s paper with others. Based on what he
sees, John says to Mike: ‘The old guy must have reviewed my paper.’ Mike discloses nothing
to John, but later Mike tells the whole story to another person, Tim:
de dicto report corresponding de re report
a. ‘John thinks that the reviewer is
a bald man in his 90s.’
X a′. ‘John thinks that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.’
7
b. ‘John thinks that a bald man in
his 90s is the reviewer.’
X b′. ‘John thinks that a bald man in
his 90s is Mary.’
7
c. ‘John thinks that the reviewer
and a 90-year old bald man are
the same person.’
X c′. ‘John thinks that Mary and a 90-
year old bald man are the same
person.’
7
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As (12) shows, under Sub-context A, i.e., the predication sub-context, the de dicto identity report
(12c) is infelicitous, and there is a felicity contrast between the de dicto reports (12a) and (12b).7
Thus, under this sub-context, [[the reviewer is a bald man in his 90s]] is different from [[a bald man
in his 90s is the reviewer]], indicating that the use of be in the de dicto reports (12a) and (12b) is
asymmetric. Moreover, (12a′) is judged to be natural, indicating that a felicitous de re report can be
derived from the felicitous de dicto report (12a) through the substitution of co-referring names.
In contrast, under Sub-context B, i.e., the identity sub-context, the de dicto identity report (13c)
is felicitous, and the de dicto reports (13a) and (13b) are both felicitous, suggesting that the use of be
in the de dicto reports (13a) and (13b) is symmetric, so that [[the reviewer is a bald man in his 90s]]
and [[a bald man in his 90s is the reviewer]] are the same here, and just similar to (13c), both (13a)
and (13b) are de dicto identity reports. Intriguingly, under this sub-context, although the de dicto
identity reports (13a–c) are all felicitous, none of them has a felicitous corresponding de re report, as
the infelicity of (13a′–c′) shows.
Why can’t de re reports be derived from de dicto identity reports? In the next section, I will
focus on identity statements of the pattern A is B and propose an account for this issue.
5 Proposal: Semantics of Symmetric Be and Identity Statements
In the previous section, the contrast between (12) and (13) empirically motivates the existence of a
symmetric use of be. To fully appreciate the difference between asymmetric and symmetric be, we
need to take a closer look at the two sub-contexts.
In the predication context (12), John the attitude holder has access only to one res, the author
of the review he reads, and he is acquainted with the res only through reading the review written
by the res. In other words, in the inner story of the attitude holder, there is only one character,
i.e., the reviewer, and the attitude holder ascribes the property of being a bald man in his 90s to
this character. The analysis of asymmetric be in (9a) (repeated here as (14)) fits this sub-context
perfectly: asymmetric be takes two arguments – the property λw.λx.[90-year-old bald man(w)(x)] of
type 〈s,et〉 and the individual [[the]][[[reviewer]](w)] of type e (i.e., the contextually unique reviewer).
Under this context, since in the de dicto report, the semantic contribution of the reviewer is purely
extensional, it can be replaced by a contextually co-referring name (i.e., Mary).
(14) [[beasymmetric]]w〈〈s,et〉,et〉
def
= λP〈〈s,et〉〉.λxe.P(w)(x) (9a)
In contrast, in the identity context (13), there are actually two characters in the inner story of the
attitude holder, i.e., the reviewer of the paper and the old man standing before the attitude holder. John
has access to two res through two acquaintance relations: He is acquainted with the res ‘the author
of the review’ through knowing that his paper is reviewed by this res. In addition, he is acquainted
with a second res ‘the bald man in his 90s’ through seeing this res talking about his paper in a party.
Eventually the attitude holder draws the conclusion that there is an identity relation between these
two characters. Thus, in a de dicto identity report, there are necessarily two res.
In sum, as (15) shows, the fundamental difference between (12) and (13) is that de dicto
predication reports are about one res, while de dicto identity reports are about two res. The other
differences between (12) and (13) are just based on this fundamental difference.
(15) Comparing the empirical data shown in (12) and (13):
Predication sub-context (12) Identity sub-context (13)
number of res 1 2
de dicto reports (12a): predication statement (13a) and (13b): identity statements
the use of be asymmetric symmetric
de re reports available: see (12a′) unavailable: see (13a′) and (13b′)
7Percus and Sharvit 2014 notices that with a special intonation pattern, an asymmetric attitude report, say
Kevin thinks Becky is Dan, can be reversed as Kevin thinks Dan is Becky, with the felicity/truth condition
unchanged; Percus and Sharvit 2014 analyzes this reversed pattern as the result of a focus projection. Such
attitude reports with a focus projection and a special intonation pattern will not be considered in this paper.
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Now recall that, as shown in Section 2, the derivation of a felicitous de re report is based on the
co-reference relation between two expressions that refer to the same res. Thus, it follows necessarily
that any expression in a de dicto report can go through such a substitution of co-referring names, if
and only if the semantic contribution of this expression in the de dicto report is purely extensional.
Given the fact that the de dicto identity report (13a) is felicitous but such an attitude report as
(13a′) is judged to be infelicitous, we can deduce that in identity statements of the pattern A is B, the
semantic contribution of the expressions related by symmetric be (here A and B) cannot be purely
extensional: It has to be both extensional (i.e, as res names) and intensional.
Through our analysis of asymmetric be (9b) (repeated here as (16)), we already know how an
individual name can contribute intensionally: (16) shows that when asymmetric be apparently relates
two individual names y and x, y is interpreted as a contextually salient property P(w,y) of type 〈s,et〉
and contributes intensionally, while x, as a res name of type e, contributes extensionally.
(16) [[beasymmetric]]w〈e,et〉
def
= λye.λxe.P(w,y)(w)(x) (9b)
Therefore, based on this discussion of identity statements in attitude reports as well as the analysis of
asymmetric be, I propose (17) as the semantics of symmetric be:
(17) [[besymmetric]]w〈e,et〉
def
= λye.λxe.P(w,y)(w)(x)∧P(w,x)(w)(y)
As (17) shows, symmetric be relates two individual names y and x (of type e), and there are two
contextually salient properties coerced from these two names, i.e., P(w,y) and P(w,x), so that the
contextually salient property P(w,y) holds for the res named x in the possible world w, and similarly,
the contextually salient property P(w,x) holds for the res named y in the possible word w.
Evidently, in such an analysis, when two individual names are related by a symmetric be, both of
these names contribute extensionally and intensionally. We can in effect consider the symmetric use
of be as a double use of asymmetric be.
Based on this analysis of symmetric be, (18) shows in details why felicitous de dicto identity
reports cannot have corresponding de re reports through the substitution of co-referring names:
(18) a. Lexical items (see (6a) for the definition of [[think]]w and [[the]]):
[[John]]e
def
= John; [[Mary]]e
def
= Mary; [[reviewer]]〈s,et〉
def
= λws.λxe.[reviewer(w)(x)]
[[bald man in his 90s]]〈s,et〉
def
= λws.λxe.[90-year-old bald man(w)(x)]
I assume [[a]]〈et,e〉 can work as a choice function fchoice: [[a]] = fchoice
def
= λP〈et〉. fchoice(P)
(i.e., a certain contextually salient P)
b. Deriving the truth condition of a de dicto identity report:
[[the reviewer is a bald man in his 90s]]〈st〉
= λw.[[[the]][[[reviewer]](w)]][[besymmetric]][ fchoice[[[bald man in his 90s]](w)]]
Thus, [[besymmetric]] takes two arguments of type e: (i) the contextually unique reviewer in
w (I will write this as Rw); (ii) a certain contextually salient 90-year-old bald man in w (I
will write this as Bw). Therefore, [[the reviewer is a bald man in his 90s]]〈st〉
= λw.[P(w,Bw)(w)(Rw)∧P(w,Rw)(w)(Bw)]
[[John thinks that the reviewer is a bald man in his 90s]]w0de dicto
= ∀w′ ∈ Doxw0(John)[P(w′,Bw′ )(w
′)(Rw
′
)∧ [P
(w′,Rw′ )(w
′)(Bw
′
)]
i.e., every world w′ in the set of John’s belief worlds is such that the contextually salient
properties of the expression ‘a certain 90-year-old bald man in w′’ holds in w′ for the res
named ‘the contextually unique reviewer in w′’, and vice versa.
c. Accounting for the de re reading derivation blocking effect of a de dicto identity report:
In the given context, [[Mary]] and [[the reviewer]]w
′∈Doxw0 (John) co-refer, thus
(i) ∵ both [[Mary]] and Rw
′
are extensional, from ∀w′ ∈ Doxw0(John)[P(w′,Bw′ )(w
′)(Rw
′
)],
it follows that ∀w′ ∈ Doxw0(John)[P(w′,Bw′ )(w
′)(Mary)]
(i.e., the substitution based on the co-reference relation can happen);
(ii) However, in ∀w′ ∈Doxw0(John)[P(w′,Rw′ )(w
′)(Bw
′
)], the semantic contribution of Rw
′
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is intensional: P
(w′,Rw′ ) means the contextually salient property (of type 〈s,et〉) coerced
from the expression ‘the contextually unique reviewer in w′’. Therefore, no substitution
of co-referring res names can take place here.
(iii) Overall, for ∀w′ ∈ Doxw0(John)[P(w′,Bw′ )(w
′)(Rw
′
)∧P
(w′,Rw′ )(w
′)(Bw
′
)], no substitu-
tion of co-referring res names can happen, which accounts for the fact that for a de dicto
identity report, no felicitous de re report can be derived from it.
6 Discussion I: Think vs. Dream
Percus and Sauerland 2003 and Sudo 2014 claim that the semantics of imagination reports should be
different from the semantics of belief reports: They present the contrast shown in (19) as empirical
evidence to support this claim. According to their claim, as (19) shows, the de dicto belief report (19a)
has a corresponding de re report (19a′), while the de dicto dream report (19b) has no corresponding
de re report: (19b′) is judged to be infelicitous.
(19) BARE CONTEXT: Mary anonymously reviewed John’s paper.
de dicto report Corresponding de re report
a. John thinks that the reviewer is
a bald man in his 90s.
X a′. John thinks that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.
X
b. John dreams that the reviewer
is a bald man in his 90s.
X b′. John dreams that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.
7
As I have shown in Section 4 (see (11–13)) and Section 5, in order to judge whether a felicitous
de dicto report has a felicitous corresponding de re report, we need to know how the attitude holder
thinks about a certain res, and how many res are involved in the belief (or other attitudes) of the
attitude holder. In other words, such a context as the bare context shown in (19) is insufficient for us
to judge whether a felicitous de dicto report has a felicitous corresponding de re report or not.
Given the background that Mary anonymously reviewed John’s paper, (20) and (21) show that
such an imagination reporting predicate dream actually patterns with the canonical belief reporting
predicate think: For a de dicto predication dream report (20a), a corresponding de re dream report is
available, (20a′) is judged to be felicitous; in contrast, for de dicto identity dream reports (21a–c), no
corresponding de re dream report is available, (21a′–c′) are all judged to be infelicitous.
(20) SUB-CONTEXT C – PREDICATION CONTEXT IN THE DREAM: Afterwards, when John meets
Mike, the editor, he tells Mike that he thinks the review is old-fashioned and has a weird
empathy for baldness, and John says: ‘I was thinking about the review even in my dream, and
in my dream, I came to believe that the one who wrote that must be a bald man in his 90s.’
Mike discloses nothing to John, but later he tells the whole story to another person, Tim:
de dicto report corresponding de re report
a. ‘John dreams that the reviewer
is a bald man in his 90s.’
X a′. ‘John dreams that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.’
X
b. ‘John dreams that a bald man in
his 90s is the reviewer.’
7 b′. ‘John dreams that a bald man in
his 90s is Mary.’
7
c. ‘John dreams that the reviewer
and a 90-year old bald man are
the same person.’
7 c′. ‘John dreams that Mary and a
90-year old bald man are the
same person.’
7
(21) SUB-CONTEXT D – IDENTITY CONTEXT IN THE DREAM: Afterwards, John has a dream: in
John’s dream, John and Mike, the editor, go to a party; there John sees an old man talking
about John’s paper with others. When John wakes up, he calls Mike and tells Mike: ‘I had a
dream. In my dream, I saw an old guy, more particularly, a bald man in his 90s, talking about
my paper and I told myself that this guy must be the reviewer.’ Mike says nothing to John,
but later Mike tells the whole story to another person, Tim:
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de dicto report corresponding de re report
a. ‘John dreams that the reviewer
is a bald man in his 90s.’
X a′. ‘John dreams that Mary is a bald
man in his 90s.’
7
b. ‘John dreams that a bald man in
his 90s is the reviewer.’
X b′. ‘John dreams that a bald man in
his 90s is Mary.’
7
c. ‘John dreams that the reviewer
and a 90-year old bald man are
the same person.’
X c′. ‘John dreams that Mary and a
90-year old bald man are the
same person.’
7
Since the judgments under the predication dream context (20) pattern with the judgments under
the context (12), and the judgments under the identity dream context (21) pattern with the judgments
under the context (13), at least with regard to the phenomena under discussion in this paper, we don’t
need to have a fundamentally different treatment for attitude reporting predicates dream and think.
As (22) illustrates, small changes on the specification of possible worlds are sufficient:8
(22) [[(20a)]] = [[John dreams that the reviewer isasym a bald man in his 90s]]
w0
de dicto
= ∀w′′ ∈ Dreamw0(John)[being a bald man in his 90s in w′′(w′′)(R
w′∈Doxw0 (John))]
i.e., every world w′′ in the set of John’s dream worlds is such that the property of ‘being a
90-year-old bald man in w′′’ holds in w′′ for the res named ‘the contextually unique reviewer
in w′ (w′ is in the set of John’s belief worlds)’.
7 Discussion II: Frege’s Puzzle on Identity Statements
Frege 1892 formalizes the natural language expression A is B as ‘A = B’ and raises the following
question: Why do ‘A = A’ and ‘A = B’ have different cognitive values? To solve the puzzle, Frege
innovated the distinction between extensional and intensional meanings. However, his analysis
suggests that it adopts these two assumptions: (i) the two parts connected by ‘=’ have the same type,
i.e., they are either both extensional or both intensional; (ii) ‘=’ represents an equivalence relation.
Therefore, Frege 1892 cannot give a satisfactory answer to its puzzle: When A and B are of the same
type, it seems that the cognitive difference between ‘A = A’ and ‘A = B’ remains unaccounted for.
As I have shown in my analysis, in natural languages, such words as symmetric be express
an identity relation, which is essentially a double predication and thus is fundamentally different
from a (value) equivalence relation. This analysis very naturally accounts for Frege’s puzzle: Since
the property coerced from a res necessarily holds for that res itself, it follows naturally that such
sentences as (23a) are tautologies that do not provide new information; in contrast, (23b) and (23c)
are informative, because the predications here are not tautological and provide new information.
(23) a. [[Tully is Tully]]w = P(w,Tully)(w)(Tully) ; a tautology
b. [[Tully issym Cicero]]w = P(w,C)(w)(T)∧P(w,T)(w)(C) ; an identity statement
c. [[Tully isasym Cicero]]w = P(w,Cicero)(w)(Tully) ; a predication statement
Thus, the current analysis converges with Fine’s (2007) main idea on the semantic relationism:
Sometimes, the interpretation of a linguistic expression (e.g., Tully in Tully is Cicero) does not solely
depend on itself, but crucially on its relation with other elements in a sentence.
8Ninan (2008, 2012) argues that imagination reports should be analyzed differently from belief reports, and
here is his argument: An attitude holder, say Ralph, is acquainted with a res, say Ortcutt, through seeing this
res playing football, and in this context, the de re report Ralph imagines that Ortcutt is not playing football
is felicitous if Ralph indeed has such an imagination. Ninan (2008, 2012) claim that such data challenge the
neo-Russellian-style analysis for de re reports, since the property λw.λx.play football(w)(x) has to both (i)
hold for the res (∵ Ralph is acquainted with the res through seeing him playing football) and (ii) not hold
for the res (∵ Ralph imagines the res is not playing football). I think Ninan’s (2008, 2012) argumentation
is not valid, since here the world variables taken by the property can be different. (Consider also such non-
counterfactual/non-imaginary sentences as The escaped prisoners are back in custody (see e.g., Keshet 2010);
see also Yanovich 2011 for an argumentation against Ninan 2008’s view; my analysis in (22) is similar to
Yanovich 2011’s analysis.)
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8 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, based on empirical evidence from attitude reports, I motivate the existence of symmetric
be and argue that in natural languages, the identity relation is not a primitive, but a double predication.
In Zhang (to appear), I will extend the current account for symmetric be to analyze the adjective
same.
There is one remaining issue: Orin Percus (p.c.) points out that in the identity context (see (13)
and (21)), the sentence John thinks/dreams that Mary is talking about his paper has no felicitous de
re reading. Presumably, in such a context, the felicity of this attitude report depends on whether the
character representing the anonymous reviewer in John’s inner story (i.e., the res) has already some
properties (e.g., being a bald man in his 90s) that do not hold for the actual reviewer Mary ; if the narra-
tor thinks so, then there is no co-reference relation between [[Mary]] and [[the reviewer]]w
′∈Doxw0 (John).
A full account for Percus’ puzzle probably needs a dynamic semantics that keeps track of introducing
res, adding properties to res, and integrating res, and this is left for future research.
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